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SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 
OF VIRGINIA 
AT RICHMOND. 
HOME BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION 
'lJ8. 
EVA CLARK. 
REPLY NOTE OF ARGUMENT FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF IN ERROR. 
AS TO THE DEMURRER. 
It is claimed in the note of argument filed by the learned 
counsel of the defendant in error that the notice of motion 
for judgment in this case is good, as it is governed by 
Section 6046 of the Code. That section is the general law 
applying to notice of motion for judgment, but notice ini 
this case is brought on a policy of insuranee. Such notice· 
-.,.. 
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is not governed by Section 6046 but by Section 6094. 
'l'he£o~e two sections are to be construecl together, being in 
patri materia.. Indeed, Section 6094 should be treated as 
a paragraph or part of Section 6046. Under Section 6094, 
no particular form of action is necessary, but it is suf-
ficient for the plaintiff to file a complaint in writing7 which 
has been done in this case in the fonn of a notice fot" 
motion of judgment. But that section further requh·es ~ 
that there shall be filed with such notice of motion folt 
judgment, the original policy or a sworn copy of the 
policy, upon which the action is brought. This was noti, 
done, and not being done the notice is demurrable. 
Under Section 6046, if the notice is brought upon an. 
account, it is demurrable, if the plaintiff does not file with 
his notice an account stating distinctly the several items 
of his claim. It is tt~e that in such a motion on an ac-
count, the above is not necessary where the several items 
wre pl·ainly rlescribed in the notice, but there is no such 
exception 'vhere the notice of motion for judg1nent is 
brought on a policy of insurance. The requir.ement of the 
statute is not that the policy shall be described in the no-
tice of motion, but that there shall be filed with such notice 
the otiginal policy or a sworn copy thereof. This is the 
plain distinction betw.een an action on an account and an 
action on a policy of insurance. The action on the policy 
is. not good whet•e the plaintiff fails to file with his notice 
for judgment the original policy or a sworn copy thereof, 
even though such policy be described in the notice of 
motion for judgment; and in that event the notice is de-
murtYfl.ble. The necessity fot~ the filing of the policy of in-
surance or a copy thereof is a material requhement of the 
statute. In its absence, whatever may be the particular 
form of action, it is not. good unless there is filed with the 
complaint the policy or a. copy thereof. Lem ita- scripta. 
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The Legislature having made this a n1aterial requirement, 
the form of action, whatever it is, is not good, unless it 
conf01ms to the statute. 
In the blief of the defendant in errot· it is said "In the 
J\Iorotock case ( 91 Va. 259) no copy of the policy was 
served on the defendant and the court overruled the de-
Jnurrer." No copy of the policy was requi1•ed to be served 
on the defendant but an examination of the record shows 
that the policy was filed with the notice and the first o1·dm· 
entered was to the effect that the defendant not apperuing, 
judgment was given for the plaintiff "the notice and in-
sti-ttnlP.llt sued on being seen and inspected by the court." 
QUESTION ON CROSS-EXAJ\iiiNATION OF THE 
W.ITNESS, l\'fAGGIE THOMAS. 
As to this second assignment of error, the learned coun-
sel cites extensively f1•om the case of Beavers vs. Oommon-
'mealth, 147 Va. 585. In that case, as the opinion states, the 
question simply tended to show his general1·eputatiou for 
violating the prohibition statute (147 Va. at page 587). 
In the instant case, the question was as to a conviction fot• 
violating the pt·ohibition law. 
In Allen vs. Oom,monwealth, 122 Va. 841, the credibility 
of the witness was sought to be attacked by asking him 
whether on another occasion he had not asked the repairer 
of his buggy to I"aise his hill from $6.00 to $12.00. It is 
true that the Court does say that in questions on cross-
examination affecting the credibilit~ of the witness, they 
should be left to the discretion of the Cou1i in the par-
ticular case, but the Court also says (147 Va. at page 585) 
tha.t this is a judicial discretion, and if not properly· exei·· 
rised is error. In the instant case, we respectfully submitl 
that. this discretion was not properly exercised. · 
4 
In Uh7Js cnse, I•' G'l·att. ( 47 Va.) 706, it was held that the 
record of the conviction of a witness for petty l01rceny in. 
an,othe.r state "ras ri.ot adn1issible to impeach the veracity 
of the witness. In the instant case, the record was a record 
im.peaching the veracity of the witness in the court in 
which the instant case arose. Besides, in Uhl's case, ther~ 
is no opinion by the Court. 
In the b1ief of the defendant in error, it is said "In J ... ang-
hol-ne's Case, 76 Va. 1012, it was held that it was not per-
nlissible to ask a witness if he had been convicted of an 
offense which did not involve his character for truth on· 
oath." This is not a correct staten1ent of what was de-
cided in that case. What the Cou1~ said was that it was 
not permissible to ask a witness if he had been convicted 
of an offense without stating what was the offense. In that 
case, the question was "Upon what charge he had been 
m"I·ested?" (76 Va., page 1015.) In the instant case, the 
question asked 'vas not reg"arding any arrest or indict-......._ 
ment where the accused is pl~esumed to be innocent, but 
regarding a conviction and the offense was clearly stated 
in the question as put. 
REPLY TO THIRD AND FOURTH ASSIGNliE:NTS 
OF ERROR. 
In attempting a reply to these assignments of error, 
counsel for the defendant in eiTor also attempts to raise 
the question as to whethei" it was not the duty of the 
insurance company, having certain monies in its hands 
due Blanche Matthews on a policy taken out by her sister, 
Ella Goodn1an, to apply such funds to the payment of the 
premiun1. This, of cout~e, is in the shape of cross-error-+ 
and whether defendant in error has brought himself with-
in Rule 8 of this Court is, we subtnit, very doubtful. The 
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point was presented in the lower court by Instruction B 
( R., page 108) offered by the plaintiff below and refused 
by the Court. The law on this point was set forth by the 
granting of Instruction IV offered by th.P.. defendant and 
given by the Court (R., p. 111). It is true, the record 
shows that Instruction B was refused and excepted to, but 
there are no gt•ounds stated as to why this refusal was, 
objected to. As we understand Rule 22 of the Court, the 
ground of such exception should have been stated with 
reasonable certainty for it to be considet-ed by this Court 
and in order to make this exception good on cross appeal. 
However, assu1ning that the point has been properly 
raised before this Court, we will briefly examine the au-
thorities cited to sustain th.e contention that it was the 
company's duty to apply the amount so due upon the prem-
iunl in default. He cites 14: R. C. L., section 138, page 966. 
That section distinctly says that the amount that can be 
applied to premiums are amounts due either· fo1· dividends! 
declared or other funds which it may have in its hands· 
belonging to the insured. This section is partially, butJ 
not completely quoted in the case of Pac. A/ ut. L. J.ns. Go. 
vs. TwrU11,gton, 140 Va. 748. It is not correctly quoted in: 
the case of Atl011ttia L. Ins. Go. vs. Bender, 146 Va., at 
page 318, as there is left out the words "dividends declared 
or othe1· funds." We respectfully submit that this quota-
tion from this leading text book shows that the words 
"other funds" means other funds of a similar characteu 
to dividends, such as }()all or cash value, surplus and, in 
some cases, sick benefits. But the policy sued on had none 
of these rights and there were no such funds to be ap·plied 
to the payment of the premiums. Section 138 of 14 R. C. 
· L. closes with the statement "The fact. that the insurer 
owes the insured money on a tl·ansaction not connected 
with the insuranre does not prevent a forfeiture for ~on-
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payment. of an assesstnent.'' In the instant case, the 
n1oney due Blanche :Matthews was not connected with the 
insurance now sued for, ~ut on the contrary "Tas due Ollj 
another policy on the life of her sister, Ella Goodman. 
The leading case on the subject is OO;y·wood vs. S'u.preme.. 
l.J.odge, 86 N. E. (Ind.) 482, 17 Ann. Cas. 503, 23 L. R. A. 
( N. S.) 302 and note. 
Suppose Blanche Matthews had been a chru~voman who 
cleaned up the office of the defendant at Hampton and 
the1-e was $2.00 due her for such services. There would 
be no right or duty on the· defendant company to apply 
this $2.00 to the 'veekly premium which Blanche Matthews 
failed to pay. In the same way, the fact that there 'vas 
due Blanche :Matthews money on a different policy on the 
life of a third person did not hnpose any duty upon the 
Company to apply the amolmt so due to the paym·ent of 
the prenlium, and the Judge so instructed ( R. Instruc-
tion I,r, page 111.) 
All the cases cited by the learned counsel fo1· the de-
fendant in ert•or at·e cases where the amount due was due 
on the policy sued on. Where no such sun1 was due, then 
the1·e was no duty upon the Cmnpany no1· did it have any 
right to apply other sums due on other tr-ansactions. 
We do not see any benefit the learned counsel gets fron1 
the Turlington ease. In that case it was held that there 
'vas no loan or cash value due upon the particula1· policy 
and hence there was no duty or right of the insurance 
company to pay the premium. In the instant case, the1·e 
is nothing clue in the way of loan or cash value, or divi-
dends, or surplus or sick benefits, or any other su1n due 
from the Company on the particular policy sued on. There 
was no sum arising out of the contr·act of insurance sued 
on, but on another and different liability which was nou 
the subject of offs(~t. 
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Pac. Llfu.t. I,. Ins. Oo. vs. 'J'~u;rlin.gton, 140 Va. 748. 
In the Pennsylvania case, Gi~ratrd L. Ins. Oo. vs. j}fu.t. L. 
Ins. Go., 97 Pa. St., page 27, there were dividends on the 
particular policy and the insured was in the habit of ap-
plying these dividends to his pr~emiums. ·Such was the 
case also of the Mut. L. Ins. Co. of N.Y. vs. B'reland, 117 
lVIiss. 479, 78 So-: 362. The cases of Rogers vs. Union, eta. 
Soo., 111 Ky. 598, 64 S. W. page 444; the Missouri case, 
North vs. Natl. L. & A. Ins. Oo. (1\'Io. App.), 231 S. W. 
page 667; and the Ar·kansas case, Reliance L. Ins. Oo. vs. 
Halrdy, 144 Ark. 190, 222 S. W. 12, were all cases where 
sick benefits, du~ the insured in excess of the dues owing 
by him, were applied to the payment of his dues. 
The contrary was held in·Ancien.t O•rde~r, eta. vs. Moore, 
1 Ky. L. Rep. 93; 17 Ann. Cas. 507. In the instant case, 
there were no sick benefits to be applied to the payment 
of the pr~emium due by Blanche M:atthe,vs on January 10, 
1927, on the policy sued on. In the other Arkansas case, 
Union Cent. L. In,s. Oo. vs. Oalilwcll, 68 At"k. 505, 58 S. W. 
355, 23 L. R. A. ( N;. S.) page 306 Note, it was held that 
{lividends due on the policy were applicable to avoid a 
lapsing or for·feiture of the policy. In the instant case, 
there ·w·ere no such dividends. 
Without discussing the Hardy case, 144 Ark. 190 at! 
length, the facts of that case show that the decision is 
opposed to the decision of this Court in A .. tl. L. Ins. Oo. vs. 
Bender, 146 Va. 312. In the Ar·kansas case, the insured 
lla.d accepted and cashed the check for the sick benefitS' 
and, hence, there was nothing due him that could be ap-
plied to the payment of the premium. 
The case of Union Tn.c;. Co. vs. Greenleaf, 64 Me. 123, 
has no application to t.he instant case. The question there 
was that. a note given for the premium and passed by the 
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insurance company to another insurance company for a 
debt was made by Greenleaf and he was held liable there-
on. The other case cited in Note 46, 32 C. J ., page 1203,. 
section (e) is tllat of Walker vs. Metrop. Ins. Oo., 54: 1\'Ie .. 
Thm·e was no exact p·retnium stated in the second policy,. 
wltich was gotten out as a builder-'s risk, btr,t it 'I.Va8 agreed 
lJettveen tlw parties that the premium should be taken out 
of a sum due by·the insurance company for a former fire 
on the san1e house. There was a second fire and the Court 
held that the premium must be paid as above agreed to 
and the policy could not be forfeited. There is no evidence 
in this case showing that there was ever any agreement be-
tween the defendant co1•poration or its proper officers and 
Blanche Matthews that the premium due by her on Janu-
ary 10, 1927, should: be paid out of the amount coming· to-
her as a beneficiary under the policy taken out by hel"· · 
sister,. E,lla Goodman .. 
Even as to dividends, it is held in :Maryland and New· 
York that they are not to be applied on account of pl~em­
iums in the absence of the assent or request of the insured .. 
Mut. F. ln.fJ .. Oo. vs. Mille'l'" Lodge, 58 }!d. 463. 
Whee lEn" vs. Oouu. M ut. L. Ins .. Oo., 82 N .. Y. 543, 3T 
... t\nn. Rep. 594. 
The citation front Corpus Juris, 32 C. J., page 1308,. 
section 548 as well as the authorities cited show that the 
general language quoted is applicable only where there are 
dividends, loan or· cash value, surplus or funds. of the same-
eha.raeter due on the policy, that the Company is required 
to apply the same rather than fotofeit the :policy for non-
payment of premium .. 
In Underwood vs. Secwrity Life Oo., 108 Texas 381, 194 
S. W. 585, it was held that the _policy was properly for~ 
ieited: for non-payment of pretnium, although the insuredi 
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wus au agent of the company and entitled to a sufficient 
commission to have paid the premium. 
Leffingwell vs. (hand Lodge, 86 Iowa 27{), 53 N. W. 243. 
Pister vs. Keystone. Etc. Asso., 3 Pa. Super·. Ct., page 50. 
See also Leon01rd vs. P1·o·vident Etc. Soc. (C. C. A.), 130 
Fed. 287. 
The Court cannot avoid a forfeiture where insured can-
not show some good and substantial ground m the conduct 
of the company upon which to base a reasonable excuse 
for the default. It must be a just and r~nable ground, 
one on 'vhich the insured has a right to rely. 
Thomps011t vs. Knickerbocker L. I-ns. Go., 104 U. S. 252, 
260, 26 L. Ed. 765. . 
Seaback vs. 1J1etrop. L. Ins. Oo., 274 Ill. 51(), 113 N. E. 
862. 
]l(JJ1·m,m· Etc. Asso. vs. 1lla .. ~on, 65 Ind. App. 66, 116 N. E. 
852. 
Not even a court of equity can release against the fot·· 
feiture under the ch·cumstances testified to in this case. 
Klein vs. N.Y. L. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 88, 26 L. Ed. 662. 
Where unknown to the insurance company, the insu1~ 
placed funds to pay a premium with an agent of very 
limited powers to bind the company and the agent failed 
to remit as agreed, it was held that this did not avoid a 
forfeiture of the policy. 
Mut. Ins. Oo. vs. Ba.ke-r (Neb.), 94 N. W. 627. 
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THE REASON }:OR THE RULE. 
There wet·e no debts which could be offset the one 
against the other·. There "ret·e n1utual demands, but cer-
tainly no mutual den1ands which would necessarily extin-
guish each other. The Company owed Blanche Matthews 
$144.00, but it had no right, in the absence of any au-
thority from her, to pay the premium due by her on 
January lOth on het• policy out of this amount. As to this 
pren1iunt due January lOth, it was not a debt nor any 
personal liability of Blanche Matthews. She could pay it 
ot• not as she chose. If she did not choose, she could not 
be made to pay it. The only effect of her not paying it was 
to lapse the policy. She might choose to pay it and thus 
keep up the policy. The company had no ·way of knowing 
'vhat would be her decision until the time had expire<! 
without such payment. The only authority the Company 
had under its contract, as evidenced by the two Goodman 
policies, was to pay the beneficiary, Blanche Matthews, the 
full amount called for· in the two policies, namely, $144.00. 
To have done otherwise would have been to bt•each its con-
tract. Had Blanche l\{atthews, in accordance 'vith the ex-
press terms of her policy, reque..~te(l the pr·oper officers of 
the company before he1· premium of January lOth fell due,. 
to take it out of this snm and they had agreed to do this, 
the case 'vould. have presented a different question. But 
in the a.bs(l'.nce of any evidence of such request of its prope1· 
officers by Rlanrh 1\fatthews, the Company could make no 
such deduction, nor can it now be said, since her sudden 
death, that the rompa.ny oug·ht to have avoided the lapsing 
of the policy by doing that which it Itad no right or au-
thority to do. Sympathy may, but the legal rights of the 
parties will not, justify sustaining a claim that the com-
pany should now be required to make a deducti()n of the 
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premiu1u <lue January lOth on the policy sued on from the 
pr·oceeds of another policy on the life of another person. 
Neither in law o1· in morals can there be such offsets, nor" 
do these demands, though mutual, extinguish each other. 
1Vh~re there at•e dividends or other surplus funds, due on. 
the pat-ticular policy sufficient in amount for the purpose, · 
it is just and proper to requit-e the company to pay unpaid 
premiums rather than decla1·e the policy forfeited. But to 
I~equire the company, in o1·der to pr·event the lapsing of a 
policy, out of funds due on another and different policy, 
to pay premiun1s \Vhich the insured had failed or refused 
to pay would impose an obligation for \Vhich there is no 
lawful a-uthority and \vould produce a confusion and un-
eer·tainty to which the con1pany should not be subjected. 
In carrying out the plain terms of a policy and paying the 
full amount, the company would never be safe until it had 
examined its files to see if the pai'ty to whom the sum was 
due did not owe a pren1ium or~ premiun1s on he1· own poli-
cies and deduct such premiums so as to keep the policy 
from lapsing·; and this notwithstanding it is entirely 
optional with the insured, whether he or she will pay the 
premium, and even though the insured n1ay have deter-
mined not to pay the san1e but to allow the policy to lapse. 
The company had no way of knowing the purpose of the 
insured as to paying o1· not paying the prenrlums as they 
became due, and no autho1ity of its own volition to pay 
the san1e in the absence of a prior request to the proper 
officers of the company. No such request wa.s ever made 
to its officers by Blanche ~1atthews, and there is no evi-
dence thereof in this case. 
That the foregoing correctly described the rights of the 
partiE'-S is fully sustained by Instruction IV given by the 
court. Record, p. 111. 
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INSTRUCTION A. 
The reply brief makes the following statement: "In-
struction A according to the printed record does not show: 
any exception by defendant." The record, page 108, does~ 
not have "Ex." after it. Whether this was an error of the 
clerk or the printer, we are unable to recall, but on page 
95 of the record, the Court will find that Instruction A was 
excepted to and the four grounds of exception were fully 
set forth. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WYNDHAM R. MEREDITH, 
JOHN H. BOWEN, 
Oounsel for Plailntiff in Errar. 
